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Abstract
In Machine Learning as a Service, a provider trains a deep
neural network and provides many users access to it. How-
ever, the hosted (source) model is susceptible to model steal-
ing attacks where an adversary derives a surrogate model
from API access to the source model. For post hoc detection
of such attacks, the provider needs a robust method to deter-
mine whether a suspect model is a surrogate of their model
or not. We propose a fingerprinting method for deep neural
networks that extracts a set of inputs from the source model
so that only surrogates agree with the source model on the
classification of such inputs. These inputs are a specifically
crafted subclass of targeted transferable adversarial examples
which we call conferrable adversarial examples that transfer
exclusively from a source model to its surrogates. We pro-
pose new methods to generate these conferrable adversarial
examples and use them as our fingerprint. Our fingerprint
is the first to be successfully tested as robust against dis-
tillation attacks, and our experiments show that this robust-
ness extends to robustness against weaker removal attacks
such as fine-tuning, ensemble attacks, adversarial training
and stronger adaptive attacks specifically designed against
our fingerprint. We even protect against a powerful adversary
with white-box access to the source model, whereas the de-
fender only needs black-box access to the surrogate model.
We conduct our experiments on the CINIC dataset, which is a
superset of CIFAR-10, and a subset of ImageNet32 with 100
classes. Our experiments show that our fingerprint perfectly
separates surrogate and reference models. We measure a fin-
gerprint retention of 100% in all evaluated attacks for surro-
gate models that have at most a difference in test accuracy of
five percentage points to the source model.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) are powerful classifiers de-
ployed for a wide range of tasks, e.g., image segmentation
[32], in autonomous vehicles [47], natural language process-
ing [53] and health care predictions [15]. Developing a DNN
Figure 1: Conferrable adversarial examples used as a finger-
print to link surrogate models with their source model.
for a specific task is costly because of the labor and com-
putational resources required for data collection, data clean-
ing, and training of the model. For this reason, models are
often provided by a single entity and consumed by many, for
example, in the context of Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS). A threat to the provider ismodel stealing, in which
an adversary derives a surrogate model from only API access
to a source model, but with limited access to data with ground
truth labels. An adversary with a large set of labelled training
data can always train their own model and does not need to
steal a model.
In this paper we study linkability of DNN models. A link
is a relation between a target model and a source model. A
target model is linked to a source model, if the target model
is derived from the source model. Methods of derivation in-
clude, but are not limited to, distillation [22], fine-tuning [46],
adversarial training [17,34] and model extraction [49]. A tar-
get model is not linked to a source model, when it is trained
independently of the source model from scratch, possibly on
the same data set as the source model. We call a derived tar-
get model a surrogate model and an independently trained
target model, a reference model. Linkability is the ability of
an algorithm to decide whether a target model is a surrogate
or a reference model for a given source model, i.e., whether
there is a link between the target and the source model or not.
Linkability has several applications. Assume a publicly
available model has a known vulnerability, e.g., a backdoor
[19], or bias [42]. Linkability can determine whether another
model has been derived from that model and likely carries
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over the vulnerability or bias before the use of the model
may have caused harm. Assume a MLaaS provider wants
to restrict its users not to redistribute the source model, e.g.,
through a contractual usage agreement. Since he has to pro-
vide access, he cannot prevent users from extracting mod-
els. Using linkability, the provider can determine whether an-
other model has been derived from his model.
We propose fingerprinting as a method that provides link-
ability. Watermarking of DNNs [50] also captures a notion
of linkability. Watermarking embeds a secret message into
a model that is later extractable using a secret key. A (tar-
get) model is linked to the marked (source) model if its ex-
tracted message matches the embedded one. Fingerprinting
does not embed a secret message during training (and thereby
modifies the model potentially impacting its accuracy) but
extracts an identifying code (fingerprint) from an already
trained model.
Different from watermarking schemes, our fingerprint is
specifically designed to withstand distillation (and related
model extraction) attacks. Distillation [22] is a very powerful
method to derive a target model, since the only information
reused is the classification labels of the source model. This
implies that the transfer of a fingerprint (or watermark) can
only be achieved via those classification labels. Claimed se-
curity properties of existing watermarking schemes [1, 56]
have been broken by distillation attacks [41]. Other water-
marking schemes [45] make weaker claims, but explicitly
limit the number of queries an adversary can make to ex-
clude distillation attacks. Hence, there exists no scheme that
provides linkability that has been successfully tested against
distillation attacks. For more details on related work, we re-
fer the reader to Section 7.
We exploit the transferability of adversarial examples [33]
to address this problem. Adversarial examples [44] are in-
puts with small modifications that cause misclassification of
the input. Given two models for the same classification task,
an adversarial example can be found in one model and tested
on the other. An adversarial example is called transferable if
it is misclassified in both. Targeted adversarial examples are
adversarial examples where the target class of the misclassi-
fication is fixed.
In this paper, we hypothesize that there exists a subclass
of targeted, transferable, adversarial examples that transfer
to surrogate models, but not to reference models. We call
these adversarial examples conferrable. Conferrable adver-
sarial examples can be used to provide linkability. Any con-
ferrable example found in the source model should have the
same misclassification in a target model, but a different one
in others. Linkability via conferrable adversarial examples
can withstand a very powerful attacker. The attacker may
have white-box access to the source model, i.e., all param-
eters and its architecture, but the verifier of linkability only
needs black-box access to the target model. I.e., linkability
is still feasible even if the attacker only deploys the target
model to a remote server with API access.
We empirically study the existence of conferrable adver-
sarial examples for DNNs trained on the CINIC [11] and Im-
ageNet32 [10] datasets. CINIC is a superset of the popular
CIFAR-10 [28] dataset, combinedwith downsampled images
from ImageNet [14]. Our study shows that known adversar-
ial attacks such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [34],
DeepFool [35], Iterative Gradient Method (IGM) [29] and
Carlini-Wagner (CW-L2) [5] have low success rates for gen-
erating conferrable adversarial examples.
We propose a new ensemble-based approach called C-
BIM to generate specifically conferrable adversarial exam-
ples with a high success rate. These conferrable adversar-
ial examples are used as our fingerprints. Upon verification,
they are sent to the target model to compute fingerprint accu-
racy, i.e. the agreement rate between the source model and
the target model on labelling the fingerprint. For CINIC, the
lowest measured fingerprint accuracy is 91% in the surrogate
models, while it is at most 68% in any reference model. For
ImageNet32, the fingerprint accuracy is at least 76% for any
surrogate model, while it is at most 64% for any reference
model. We decide linkability based by thresholding the fin-
gerprint accuracy with a verification threshold of θ = 0.7,
which we empirically determined from our experiments. A
target model is verified as a surrogate if and only if it has a a
fingerprint accuracy higher than the verification threshold θ.
We refer to the accuracy of this verification as the fingerprint
retention. Our experiments show perfect separability, i.e. we
measure a fingerprint retention of 100% against all attacks
when the surrogate model’s test set accuracy is at most five
percentage points worse compared to the source model.
1.1 Contributions
This work contributes
• A new subclass of targeted transferable adversarial ex-
amples, called conferrable adversarial examples. Con-
ferrable adversarial examples transfer more likely from
a source model to target models derived by knowledge
distillation of the source model, but not to target models
trained on ground-truth labels.
• An ensemble-based method that generates specifically
conferrable adversarial examples with improved suc-
cess rates over known targeted adversarial attacks.
• Game-based definitions of fingerprinting for deep neu-
ral network classifiers.
• A thorough evaluation of our fingerprinting method
based on conferrable adversarial examples for the
CINIC dataset and a subset with 100 classes from the
ImageNet32 dataset. Among other derivation attacks,
we are the first to show that our fingerprint is robust to
distillation attacks.
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We share all models and fingerprints created for this project
and give full access to the source code for research use.1
2 Background
The background comprises of deep learning, knowledge dis-
tillation, model extraction and adversarial attacks. Then we
define the problem we address.
2.1 Neural Networks
A neural network classifier is a function M : X → Y that as-
signs a likelihood to inputs X ⊆Rd for each ofK ∈N classes
Y ⊆RK . It is a sequence of layers fi,(i ∈ {1, ..,L}) in which
each layer implements a linear function followed by a non-
linear function called the activation function. A neural net-
work is called deep if it has more than one layer between
the input and output layer, called hidden layers. Hidden lay-
ers have weights and bias parameters used to compute that
layer’s neuron activations. The output layer fL(·) typically
implements a softmax activation function σ(·) that outputs
confidence scores for all classes normalized as probabilities.
σ( fL(x))i =
exp( fL(x)i)
∑ j exp( fL(x) j)
(1)
Training a neural network requires the specification of a dif-
ferentiable loss function that is optimized by gradient descent
on all trainable weights and biases. One such loss function is
the cross-entropy loss H for some ground truth y ∈ Y with
respect to the model’s prediction.
H(y, fL(x)) =− ∑
0≤k<K
(yk · log( fL(x)k)) (2)
A popular choice is the Adam [27] optimizer to implement
gradient descent. We define two functions, one for training
a classifier given an oracle O and one for assigning labels
y ∈ Y to some input D ⊆ X by a model.
• Classify(M,D) returns a vector denoting the confi-
dence score per class of a classifierM on a set of inputs
D ⊆ X . We abuse notation and write M(D) instead of
Classify(M,D) for inline paragraphs.
• Train(O,D) returns a classifierM trained on the dataset
D ⊆ X and labels O(D)⊆ Y .
In practice, the function Train(O,D) is almost guaranteed
to output two different models for the same dataset D even
when all hyperparameters are the same, due to the random-
ness in the training function, e.g., the random initialization
of weights.
1The GitHub repository will be made available soon.
2.2 Distillation
Distillation has been proposed by Buciluaˇ et al. [2] and was
generalized by Hinton et al. [22] as a way to compress knowl-
edge from a source classifier into a less complex target clas-
sifier. The problem when training only one target classifier is
that hard labels capture no information about class similari-
ties beyond the ground truth class for each input. When the
target classifier is trained on hard labels, it has been found
to generalize worse to unseen examples [22]. The idea in
distillation is to use a complex model trained on the hard la-
bels to create soft labels that also assign probabilities to other
classes than the maximum class prediction, which enhances
knowledge transfer between the models. For deep neural net-
works, generating soft labels is done by incorporating a dis-
tillation temperature T into the softmax layer that re-scales
the logits of the source and target model during training. For
T → ∞ the softmax output for each class converges to 1/K
for K classes. The softmax of the target model is changed as
follows.
σ′( fL(x))i =
exp( fL(x)i/T )
∑ j exp( fL(x) j/T )
(3)
We refer to a target model as surrogate model when it has
been derived from a source model through knowledge distil-
lation with any distillation temperature T . Any other model
trained independently of the source model is called a refer-
ence model.
We are particularly interested in distillation attacks with a
distillation temperature of T = 1, because an adversary can
not control the temperature T for an already trained source
model. As confirmed by related work [41], distillation at-
tacks are a powerful class of removal attacks against linka-
bility for deep neural networks.
2.3 Model Extraction
Model extraction attacks and defenses have received much
research attention lately [25, 26, 30, 37, 38, 49]. In that set-
ting, an adversary can only access the source model as a
black-box, i.e. by its input-output behavior. The attack out-
put is a surrogate model that copies the source model’s func-
tionality and for which the adversary has white-box access,
meaning that all parameters of the surrogate model are ac-
cessible. Typical challenges in model extraction are a lack of
(labeled) training data, no knowledge about the source mod-
els architecture and a limit to the number of queries made to
the source model. Like distillation, model extraction attacks
are a threat to linkability. In this paper, we present finger-
printing as a deterrence to model extraction against an even
stronger adversary, who is allowed white-box access to the
source model, access to potentially unlimited unlabeled data
from the same data distribution and full knowledge of the
source model’s architecture.
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2.4 Distillation Attacks
We evaluate four known distillation attacks against linkabil-
ity:Retraining, Jagielski,Knockoff, and Papernot. The lat-
ter three are popular model extraction attacks from the re-
lated work which we refer to as distillation attacks, because
they are given white-box access to the source model.
• Retraining is distillation with a temperature of T = 1,
in which a target model is trained on the adversary’s
dataset that has been labeled by the source model.
• Jagielski et al. [25] post-process the labels received
from the source model by a distillation parameter T ′
to obtain soft labels. For an input x ∈ D and a source
model M, the soft labels M′(x) can be computed as fol-
lows.
M′(x)i =
exp(M(x)
1/T ′
i )
∑ j exp(M(x)
1/T ′
j )
(4)
• Knockoff Nets, proposed by Orekondy et al. [37], se-
lect training examples from a transfer set, which is data
from a different distribution relative to the source mod-
els data. We use the random selection approach pre-
sented by the authors and retrain on the transfer set that
has nine times more classes than the source model’s
training data.
• Papernot et al. [38] propose iterative training of a surro-
gate model on a substitute dataset labeled by the source
model, using the Jacobian computed on the surrogate
model to choose new data points to be labeled. After
receiving labels, the next training iteration begins.
Distillation attacks are a threat to the model provider, de-
spite that the adversary has to invest more computational re-
sources into retraining another model. Data collection and
cleaning, hyperparameter tuning, and model testing are typi-
cally associated with higher efforts than just model training.
Particularly small to medium-sized models are at risk of dis-
tillation, while large models such as GPT-2 [39] may only be
distilled by sufficiently motivated adversaries.
2.5 Adversarial Examples
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks,
in which a correctly classified input is perturbed to force a
misclassification. These perturbed inputs are called adversar-
ial examples [44] and they have been shown effective in prac-
tice against systems based on deep neural networks, like traf-
fic sign recognition systems [16], malware detection [18] or
speech recognition [6].
A targeted adversarial example is crafted for a target clas-
sifier Mˆ and a target class t not equal to the ground truth y.
Given some similarity measure d : X 2 → R and a correctly
labeled input x ∈ X , the goal is finding a perturbation δ so
that d(x,x+δ)≤ ε for some threshold ε∈R. Formally, a tar-
geted adversarial attack succeeds if the following condition
holds.
Mˆ(x+ δ) = t s.t. d(x,x+ δ)≤ ε (5)
Adversarial examples that are adversarial to more than
one model have a property that is called transferability
[13, 17, 48]. It has been experimentally confirmed that ad-
versarial examples span high-dimensional subspaces in the
models decision space [13, 48]. Transferable adversarial ex-
amples lie in intersections of such adversarial subspaces be-
tween different models.
Our work proposes a new property for adversarial exam-
ples called conferrability, which is a subclass of targeted
transferability. Conferrable adversarial examples transfer
from a source model only to its surrogates obtained through
distillation, but not to any reference models trained indepen-
dently of the source model.
2.6 Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks operate on a target model Mˆ and a cor-
rectly classified input x, and generate an adversarial example
x′ misclassified by Mˆ. We compare five standard adversarial
attacks from the literature with our proposed attack towards
generating specifically conferrable adversarial examples. Let
x,x′ denote the original input and the adversarial example, J
the loss function for the target model Mˆ on the logits and a
perturbation threshold ε so that ||δ||q ≤ ε for some q. The
adversarial attacks can be described as follows.
• Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [17]: A single-
step adversarial attack towards the sign of the gradient.
x′ = x− ε
sign(∇J(x))
||sign(∇J(x))||q
(6)
• Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [29]: An extension of
FGSM to an iterative attack with a step-size α, clipping
the image back to the ε ball around the original input.
x′i = x
′
i−1− clipε(α · sign(∇J(x
′
i−1))) (7)
• Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [34]: Similar to
BIM [29], but in addition to clipping x′i, at the end of
each iteration, x′i is projected onto an Lq-ball around the
original input for some norm q.
• DeepFool [35]: An iterative attack that greedily com-
putes the closest hyperplane towards a misclassification
and then applies a gradient orthogonal to that hyper-
plane to the current example.
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• Carlini-Wagner (CW-L2) [5]: An iterative approach
that optimizes a relaxed loss function by a a change of
variables using the Adam [27] optimizer.
Adversarial attacks that operate on an ensemble of tar-
get models yield higher transferability scores, as studied by
Liu et al. [33] in the context of targeted transferability. The
authors formulate an optimization problem for generating
maximally transferable adversarial examples, by computing
a weighted sum of the loss functions Ji of the i-th model to-
wards a target label t. Our proposed attack for generating con-
ferrable adversarial examples also leverages an ensemble of
models.
argmin
δ
− log(
n
∑
i=1
αiJi(x+ δ) ·1t)+λd(x,x+ δ) (8)
The existence of our fingerprint relies on the existence
of adversarial examples and to the best of our knowledge,
no defense perfectly protects against adversarial examples.
There is considerable research on adversarial robustness
[4, 7, 43, 52] both from the security and machine learning
community, but it remains an open research question whether
adversarial examples are inevitable for neural networks [40].
3 Problem Statement
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Figure 2: An overview of the interactions between the de-
fender and adversary for black-box fingerprint verification.
In this section, we present the problem statement for fin-
gerprinting and present the defenders and adversary’s capa-
bilities. The goal of the defender is to generate a set of inputs
(fingerprint) from white-box access to the source model, so
that the labelling uniquely identifies the source model and
any of its surrogates. We define the fingerprint accuracy as
the accuracy a target model achieves on the fingerprint when
the source model gives the ground-truth labels. If the finger-
print accuracy exceeds the verification threshold θ, a target
model is verified as a surrogate model. We refer to this veri-
fication accuracy as the fingerprint retention.
Our adversary has access to a set of partially labeled or
unlabeled training data D2, possibly from the same domain
of the defender’s labeled training data D1. In practice, the
adversary may only have limited access to ground-truth la-
bels, because the original labels of their dataset allow learn-
ing functionality f ′, which is different from the functionality
f performed by the source model. The adversary has white-
box access to the source model, whereas the defender only
has black-box access to the target model for verification pur-
poses. We assume the source model is unique for that task,
i.e. the adversary can not obtain labels from other source
models for the same task. The reason is that per definition,
a fingerprint has to be unique to one source model. If the ad-
versary stole one target model per accessible source model,
then the adversary could always evade black-box fingerprint
verification through majority voting among the stolen mod-
els, as shown by Hitaj et al. [23].
A limitation of any black-box verifiable fingerprinting is
that a perfect source model, i.e., one with 100% accuracy,
can not be distinguished from another perfect source model
given only truncated outputs for the predicted class. In prac-
tice, the training accuracy is often considerably higher than
the testing accuracy, and thus in our experiments, we limit
the overlap between D1 and D2. On their respective datasets,
the defender trains the source model, surrogate models and
reference models, while the adversary only trains surrogate
models. The types of models are defined as follows.
• The source model is trained on the defenders dataset
M ← Train(O,D1) for which the adversary is given
white-box access.
• Surrogate models S = {Si ← A(M,D)} which are
models distilled from the source modelM using a distil-
lation attack A and some dataset D.
• Reference models R = {Ri ← Train(O,D)} are mod-
els trained on ground truth labels independently of the
source modelM on some dataset D.
The goal of proving linkability for a source modelM is to as-
sess whether a target model Mˆ belongs to the set of reference
or surrogatemodels for a given source model. To this end,we
define two roles, namely the defender and the adversary. The
defender trains and deploys a source model that is given to an
adversary with white-box access. The adversary performs a
removal attack against linkability on the source model using
the adversary’s dataset D2, which outputs a surrogate model
of the source model. This surrogate model is deployed by the
adversary with black-box access to any user. The defender
is made aware of the suspect model, generates a set of in-
puts F (fingerprint), and starts the verification procedure, as
shown in Figure 2. The target and source model’s predictions
are compared, and the fingerprint is retained when the finger-
print accuracy exceeds the verification threshold θ ∈ [0,1] if
and only if the target model is a surrogate model. We choose
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θ empirically after evaluating our experiments. The verifica-
tion can be summarized by the following security game.
1. Defender trains a source modelM← Train(O,D1)
2. Defender selects a set of inputs F ⊆ X
3. Obtain S0 ← A(M,D2) and R0 ← Train(O,D2)
4. Defender wins if:
Pr
x∈F
[
Classify(S0,x) = Classify(M,x)
]
≥ θ
and Pr
x∈F
[
Classify(R0,x) = Classify(M,x)
]
< θ
As demonstrated by Hitaj et al. [24], the adversary may try to
evade the verification and return random labels if he detects
the verification process. We address this problem in our solu-
tion by showing that it is feasible to generate conferrable ad-
versarial examples with imperceptibly small perturbations.
4 Conferrable Adversarial Examples
In this section, we motivate and define conferrable adver-
sarial examples, present formulas to calculate conferrability
rates, and present a loss function that leads to conferrable ad-
versarial examples upon optimization.
4.1 Motivation
Conferrable adversarial examples are a subclass of targeted
transferable adversarial examples that exclusively transfer to
the set of surrogatesmodels for a source model, but not to any
reference model (see Section 3 for definitions). The intuition
for the existence of conferrable adversarial examples is that
adversarial vulnerabilities in a source model are more likely
to be carried over to surrogate models than to independently
trained reference models. Our hypothesis for the existence of
conferrable adversarial examples is based on two premises.
1. The set of targeted transferable adversarial examples be-
tween the source model and its surrogates is not empty.
2. The set of targeted transferable adversarial examples for
all models, i.e. the source model, its surrogates and the
referencemodels, is not equal to the set of targeted trans-
ferable adversarial examples between just the source
model and its surrogate models.
If these two premises hold, it follows that conferrable adver-
sarial examples must exist. Targeted transferable adversarial
examples lie in the set intersection of all adversarial exam-
ples for all models. Conferrable adversarial examples lie in
the intersection of adversarial examples for the source model
and all surrogate models, without all transferable adversarial
examples for the reference models, as depicted in Figure 3.
Related work has empirically shown the existence of tar-
geted transferable adversarial examples [33] among refer-
ence models. In our experiments,we show that both premises
hold by generating such conferrable adversarial examples.
The concept of conferrability is illustrated in Figure 3 for
the decision boundaries of one representative surrogate and
a reference model.
4.2 Definitions
In this subsection we present the formulas to compute tar-
geted transferability and conferrability. Targeted transferabil-
ity, as opposed to untargeted transferability, only succeeds
when the misclassification matches a certain target label. Tar-
geted transferability is important for the correctness of the
fingerprint. The reason is that untargeted transferable finger-
prints cannot distinguish between a high-accuracy surrogate
and a randomly initialized model because the verification de-
cides upon the errors of the model. Since we do not constrain
the target label, we can still use untargeted adversarial attacks
for our fingerprint, on the premise that we measure targeted
transferability.
The transferability score for an adversarial example is
computed as the expected adversarialness over all tested
models. Throughout the paper, when we refer to the transfer-
ability score of adversarial examples, we compute that score
purely over reference models to remain comparable to re-
lated work.
Transfer(M ,x) = Pr
M∈M
[M(x) = t] (9)
Conferrability is a metric to measure transferability of an ad-
versarial example x to surrogate models S , but not to refer-
ence modelsR . Conferrability is minimal when the adversar-
ial attack either outputs perfectly transferable or completely
non-transferable adversarial examples. It is maximal when
the adversarial example only transfers among surrogate mod-
els. Our fingerprinting produces maximally conferrable ad-
versarial examples on the training models.
Confer(S ,R ,x) = Transfer(S ,x)(1−Transfer(R ,x)) (10)
We now present the optimization constraints, where an ad-
versarial perturbation δ is searched so that x+δ constitutes a
conferrable adversarial examples.
Minimize δ s.t.
1. M(x+ δ) = t
2. Pr
S∈S
[S(x+ δ) = t]≈ 1
3. Pr
R∈R
[R(x+ δ) 6= t]≈ 1
subject to d(x,x+ δ)≤ ε
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Figure (a) summarizes the relationship between transferability and conferrability as intersections between the set of
all adversarial examples per model type. Figure (b) visualizes transferable and conferrable adversarial examples in the decision
boundaries, relative to the ground truth provided by an oracle.
Any adversarial example that satisfies these requirements for
one given source model M and any set of surrogates S and
references R is conferrable.
4.3 Conferrability Success Rates
In this section, we evaluate success rates of existing adver-
sarial attacks presented in Section 2.5 for generating targeted
transferable and conferrable adversarial examples. We show
that all existing approaches have low success rates for gener-
ating specifically conferrable examples making them unsuit-
able for fingerprinting. We then propose an ensemble-based
attack we refer to as Conferrable-BIM (C-BIM) that builds
on top of the BIM adversarial attack, but achieves a signifi-
cantly higher conferrability rate.
We use standard parameters for the adversarial attacks and
refer the reader to the appendix for more information. The
ResNet20 [21] source model is trained on a subset of 85,000
CINIC images [11] and reaches 76.96% test set accuracy.
Note that CINIC is a superset of the popular CIFAR-10 [28]
dataset combined with downsampled images from ImageNet.
We choose CINIC over CIFAR-10 because it is larger and
allows training models required to evaluate our C-BIM at-
tack, which will be introduced in the next subsection. All
surrogate and referencemodels are trained on the adversary’s
dataset D2 consisting of 85,000 CINIC images. Throughout
the paper, models trained on the adversary’s dataset D2 are
referred to as testing models. More details about the setup
and datasets are given in Section 6. We randomly select 300
images correctly classified by the source model as starting
points for the adversarial attacks and filter only successful ad-
versarial examples from the output to compute transferability
and conferrability.
Our experiments depicted in Figure 4 show that out of
all the existing attacks, CW-L2 and BIM have the highest
success rate for generating conferrable adversarial examples.
For ε = 0.15, the average transferability and conferrability
Figure 4: Conferrability scores for different perturbation
magnitudes ε ∈ {0.01,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.25,0.3} on CINIC.
for CW-L2 is 0.864 and 0.115 and for BIM the values are
0.752 and 0.197. Our experiments align with the expecta-
tion that higher values for ε result in higher success rates for
conferrable examples. In the next section we present our im-
proved adversarial attack.
4.4 Conferrable BIM
In this section, we propose our method for generating specifi-
cally conferrable adversarial examples leveraging known ad-
versarial attacks. The idea is to create an ensemble of surro-
gate and reference models with one shared input and one out-
put that computes conferrability scores per class. We define
a loss function that is minimized when the ensemble predicts
the maximal conferrability score. For optimizing the pertur-
bation δ we use BIM that only updates the input but keeps
the model frozen. We refer to this attack as C-BIM.
The ensemble model ME is composed of the surrogates
S and references R and implements average voting on the
union of the predictions from both types of models. For ease
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of notation, let SM be the set of surrogates that also contains
the source modelM.
Surr(M,S ,x) =
1
|SM|
∑
S∈SM
Classify(S,x) (11)
Ref(R ,x) =
1
R
∑
R∈R
Classify(R,x) (12)
As a next step, we compute the conferrability score to obtain
the output ofME . We define the vector of all ones as 1 ∈ Y .
ME(M,S ,R ,x) = (1−Ref(R ,x))Surr(M,S ,x) (13)
Then we define a linear loss as for the prediction of the en-
semble on input x with target label t.
LE =−ME(x) · t (14)
Note that the output over all classes of our ensemble is not
a probability distribution anymore, but the confidence score
for only the target label remains a probability. Our loss func-
tion sets all values, but the target confidence score to zero and
considers only the prediction of the ensemble for the target
class. We refer to this method for composing the ensemble
model out of a source model M, its surrogates S and refer-
ence models R by the function Compose(M,S ,R ), invoked
by our fingerprinting approach in Algorithm 2 from Section
5.
5 Fingerprinting
In this section we specify requirements for any fingerprinting
scheme that is robust to distillation and present our approach
based on conferrable adversarial examples.
5.1 Definitions
A fingerprinting algorithm for deep neural networks consists
of two steps: extraction and verification. The extraction step
accesses a source model M, some training dataset D and an
oracle O to provide ground-truth labels. The extraction out-
puts a fingerprint F ⊆ X and their verification keys vk ⊆ Y
for the source model. The verification process determines for
a given target model, fingerprint and verification key whether
the targetmodel is linked to the source model. Both functions
can be described as follows.
• Extract(M,D,O): Has access to a source model M,
some training data D and an oracle O to provide la-
bels for D. Extraction outputs a fingerprint F and the
labels predicted by the source model on the fingerprint
vk = {M(x)|x ∈ F }.
• Verify(MS,F ,vk): On input of a suspect model MS, a
fingerprint F and a verification key vk, Verify checks if
MS is a surrogate of the source model and outputs 1 if
and only if MS(F )≈ vk.
Given a distillation attack A0 described in Section 2.3, we
obtain all surrogate models by distilling the source model
and the reference models by training models on ground-truth
data from scratch. We define an auxiliary method to extract
a fingerprint from a model.
FModel():
1. Train the source modelM← Train(O,D)
2. Train surrogate models S = {Si|Si ← A0(M,vk)}
3. Train reference models R = {Ri|Ri ← Train(O,D)}
4. Compute (F ,vk)← Extract(R ,M,S)
5. Output (R ,M,S ,F,vk)
Correctness is given if and only if surrogate models are ver-
ified as such. It is only with very small probability that any
distilled version of the source model can be generated that
is not identified by the verification as a surrogate model that
also has sufficiently high test set accuracy.
1. Defender computes (R ,M,S ,F ,vk)← FModel()
2. Obtain Mˆ0 ← Train(O,D) and Mˆ1 ← A(M)
3. Sample b
$
←− {0,1} and send Mˆb to the Defender
4. Defender wins if:
Pr[Verify(Mˆb,F ,vk) = b]≈ 1
Hitaj et al. [24] show that an adversary can evade the black-
box verification process by returning random labels when the
fingerprints are easily separable from benign inputs. We spec-
ify a non-evasiveness property, which ensures that it is not
possible to train a classifier that separates benign data sam-
ples from fingerprints. Such a fingerprint is desirable in the
public verification setting where the fingerprint is sent to the
adversary in plain during verification, because a fingerprint
can be reused multiple times. We say fingerprinting satisfies
non-evasiveness if the defender has a very high probability
of winning the following game.
1. Compute (R ,M,S ,F ,vk)← FModel()
2. Adversary performs Mˆ← A(M)
3. Sample b
$
←− {0,1}
4. Set B0
$
←−D and B1
$
←− F and send Bb to the Defender
5. Defender wins if
Pr[Classi f y(Mˆ,Bb) = b]≈ 0.5
In conclusion, we require correctness and non-evasiveness
for linkability.
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Algorithm 1 Verify(MS,F ,vk)
Input: Fingerprint F , Verification keys vk, Black-box ac-
cess to the suspect modelMS, verification threshold θ
Output: 1 if and only if MS is a surrogate ofM
1: vk′←MS(F )
Evaluate fingerprint retention
2: pret ←
1
|vk| ∑
|vk|
i=01argmax j vki j=argmax j vk
′
i j
3: if (pret ≥ θ) then
4: return 1
5: end if
6: return 0
5.2 Our Fingerprinting Algorithm
Our fingerprinting relies on generating conferrable adversar-
ial examples using the approach described in Section 4.4.
For the extraction, the defender has to train surrogates S
and reference models R on their dataset D1. We refer to
any model trained on the defenders data as training mod-
els, as opposed to testing models trained on the adversary’s
data. Our algorithm builds the ensemble model by invoking
Compose(M,S ,R ), chooses a set of starting points and exe-
cutes the adversarial attack. We choose BIM as our default
adversarial attack, because we observe the best results and it
is has a relatively fast execution time out of all the methods
tested. Finally, we filter examples with a conferrability score
above some threshold (τ = 1) and return the conferrable ad-
versarial examples as fingerprints and the verification keys.
The extraction procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.
The verification procedure sends the fingerprint to the tar-
get model and compares the returned verification keys with
the given ones to compute the fingerprint accuracy. Thereby,
we access only the maximum class prediction of the received
verification keys. A surrogate model is verified when the fin-
gerprint accuracy is larger than some threshold θ, which we
empirically choose as θ = 0.7. Our verification procedure is
summarized by Algorithm 1.
6 Experiments
Our experiments are split into two parts. First, we evaluate
the conferrability rates of the proposed C-BIM algorithm.
Then, we show that our proposed fingerprint that is built on
top of C-BIM meets the correctness and non-evasiveness re-
quirements we defined in Section 5.1.
6.1 Setup
We perform our experiments on the CINIC and ImageNet32
datasets, which can be described as follows.
• CINIC [11]: A combination of CIFAR-10 [28] and
downsampled ImageNet [14] with 10 classes and inputs
Algorithm 2 Extract(M,D,O)
Input: Training data D, Oracle O, Source Model M, Num-
ber of training models s, Minimal conferrability score τ,
Adversarial attack A
Output: Fingerprint F , Verification keys vk
1: for i= s to 0 do
2: Si ← Train(M,D)
3: Ri ← Train(O,D)
4: end for
Filter correctly predicted inputs of the source model
5: DC ← {x ∈ D|argmaxiM(x)i = argmax jO(x) j}
Build the ensemble model
6: ME ← Compose(M,S ,R )
Perform adversarial attack
7: F ′← A(ME ,DC)
Filter examples by their conferrability score
8: F ← {x ∈ F ′|Confer(S ,R ,x)≥ τ}
9: return F ,M(F )
of size 32× 32. Out of the 180,000 training images we
assign the defender 85,000 and the adversary 95,000 im-
ages. We use all remaining 90,000 images for validating
the test set accuracy.
• ImageNet32 [10]: A downsampled version of the Ima-
geNet dataset to inputs of size size 32× 32 pixels with
1000 classes. We select 100 classes and end up with
128,000 images and 5,000 test set images. We assign
the defender and adversary each 64,000 images. The
selected classes are summarized in the appendix.
We had to restrict ourselves to datasets with input sizes
32× 32 pixels due to limited computational resources. All
inputs are z-score normalized to 0 mean and 1 standard devi-
ation per channel. All surrogate models throughout the paper
are trained with the Retraining distillation attack described in
Section 2.4, while all other distillation attacks are only used
during the evaluation phase. Training of the models is done
on one NVIDIA Tesla K10 GPU. We implemented the ma-
chine learning in Keras [9] on the tensorflow v1.12 backend.
For the adversarial attack we use the Adversarial Robustness
Toolbox [36].
In total, we trained 44 surrogates and 28 reference mod-
els for CINIC and 14 surrogates and 15 reference models for
ImageNet32. We trained at least two models per architecture
for each dataset. The trained models and their accuracies are
listed in Table 2 for CINIC and Table 3 for ImageNet32. We
categorize into four different types of models: Training Sur-
rogates,TrainingReferences,Testing Surrogates andTest-
ing References, depending on the dataset they were trained
on.
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Table 1: Success rates for all adversarial attacks (ε = 0.15).
Dataset Method Transferable Conferrable
CINIC
C-IGM 0.492 0.469
IGM 0.752 0.197
PGD 0.111 0.101
DeepFool 0.033 0.036
CW-L2 0.864 0.115
ImageNet32
C-IGM 0.508 0.419
IGM 0.357 0.250
PGD 0.135 0.155
DeepFool 0.045 0.029
CW-L2 0.438 0.352
6.2 Generating Conferrable Adversarial Ex-
amples
We insert a Dropout layer to the ensemble model ME be-
fore the output layer with a dropout rate of 0.5 to prevent
overfitting of the conferrable adversarial example. We mea-
sure a conferrability score of 0.469 for C-IBM. The average
success rate for generating conferrable adversarial examples
for all attacks is summarized in Table 1. Our C-BIM algo-
rithm significantly outperforms all other approaches in pro-
ducing conferrable examples on CINIC. On ImageNet32, our
approach improves over CW-L2 by a conferrability score of
0.067. We hypothesize the improvement is smaller for Im-
ageNet32, because we only have access to fewer surrogate
and reference model and thus the model again slightly over-
fits on that particular set of training surrogates and reference
models. Nonetheless, the conferrability is sufficiently high to
perform fingerprinting with a fingerprint retention of 100%,
as demonstrated in the next subsection.
The main problem with existing adversarial attacks is that
they produce highly transferable adversarial examples also
towards reference models, which reduces their conferrability
score. The challenge in generating conferrable examples is
finding a balance in the transferability, so that only surrogate
models are affected but not reference models. A conferrabil-
ity score per sample for CINIC is illustrated in Figure 5 and
for ImageNet32 it is illustrated in Figure 6. From Figures 5
and 6 we can see that C-BIM produces conferrable adver-
sarial examples with a higher maximum conferrability score
than the other attacks, while it is less transferable to reference
models.
6.3 Fingerprinting Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the fingerprinting approach i.e.
we now evaluate over a set of images (the fingerprint) in-
stead of individual elements. The interesting measures are
fingerprint accuracy and fingerprint retention, defined in Sec-
tion 3. We evaluate the robustness of our fingerprint towards
the four distillation attacks outlined in Section 2.4, three of
which are well-established model extraction attacks. We also
show robustness against fine-tuning, adversarial training and
two adaptive attacks we designed specifically against our fin-
gerprint, namely the Ensemble and Noise Attack. We want
to reinforce the fact that our fingerprint does not have access
to any of these attacks except for the basic Retraining attack,
nor to the adversary’s training set. The attacks can be de-
scribed as follows.
• Fine-Tuning: Fine-tuning continues training the surro-
gate model on more data labeled by the source model.
1. Fine-tune last layer (FTLL): Freeze all layers ex-
cept for the final layer and fine-tune the model on
the substitute data.
2. Fine-tune all layers (FTAL): Fine-tune the whole
model.
3. Retrain last layer (RTLL): Re-initialize the last
layer and train the model with all layers frozen ex-
cept for the last one.
4. Retrain all layers (RTAL): The last layer is re-
initialized, but all layers are trained.
• Adversarial Training: The adversary fine-tunes the
whole model on adversarial examples generated from
the adversary’s dataset. We evaluate FGM and PGD.
• Distillation: We evaluate the distillation attacks de-
scribed in Section 2.4 as removal attacks. These are
Retraining, Jagielski [25], Papernot [38] and Knockoff
[37].
• Ensemble: The adversary creates multiple surrogate
models from one source model by training each surro-
gate model on non-overlapping subsets of their training
data. Then he creates an ensemble model out of all n
surrogate models with average voting and deploys this
model. The adversary hopes that the fingerprint will not
be retained in all surrogate models and that average vot-
ing removes the correct fingerprint label.
• Noise: The adversary labels their training dataset by the
source model and adds uniform random noise with mag-
nitude λ to the obtained prediction vectors. The noisy
prediction vector is computed as a weighted sum of the
noise vector and the original prediction vector,weighted
by λ and 1−λ, where λ ∈ [0,1].
• True Labels: In this attack we assume the adversary has
a certain percentage ρ ∈ {5%,10%, ..,40%} of ground-
truth labels for their data. They retrain their model mix-
ing the ground-truth data with the data labeled by the
source model.
We perform all removal attacks on the source model. For
fine-tuning and adversarial training we use 10,000 inputs la-
beled by the source model and for the adversarial training we
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 5: Conferrability scores per generated adversarial example for the CINIC dataset with ε = 0.15.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 6: Conferrability scores per generated adversarial example for a subset of ImageNet32 and ε = 0.15.
create 1000 adversarial examples. Model extraction uses all
the data available to the adversary. We find that our finger-
print withstands all attacks with 100% fingerprint retention
for a verification threshold θ = 0.7, where the surrogate has
at most an absolute accuracy difference of 5% to the source
model. The verification threshold θ has been chosen empiri-
cally and we never measured any false positive or false nega-
tive.
The results for CINIC are summarized in Tables 2 and 4
and for ImageNet32 in Tables 3 and 5. For CINIC, the low-
est fingerprint accuracy for the surrogate models is 0.92 for
VGG19 and the Retraining attack. The highest fingerprint ac-
curacy for the referencemodels is 0.68 for a DenseNetmodel.
For ImageNet32, the lowest fingerprint accuracy for the sur-
rogate models is 0.76 for VGG19 and the Retraining attack.
The highest fingerprint accuracy for the reference models is
0.64 for a MobileNetV2 model.
None of the evaluated removal attacks were able to break
our fingerprinting scheme. For all attacks, a reduction in fin-
gerprint accuracy can be explained by a reduction in the sur-
rogate model’s accuracy. This suggests that adversarial vul-
nerabilities are reliably carried over from the source model
to the surrogate model irrespective of the surrogate model’s
architecture. A certain amount of fingerprint retention in the
referencemodels may be unavoidable when - like in our case,
the referencemodels are trained with exactly the samemodel
architecture, learning objective and optimizer on a dataset
that comes from the same distribution as the defenders train-
ing set.
We demonstrated that it is possible to craft conferrable ad-
versarial examples that have very high targeted transferabil-
ity towards surrogate models, but not towards reference mod-
els. This allows us to create our fingerprinting algorithm that
reliably withstands distillation and other, weaker attacks. We
showed that it is feasible to create fingerprints with imper-
ceptibly small ε perturbations of only ε = 0.05. We defer
the non-evasiveness property of our fingerprint to the non-
evasiveness of adversarial examples: as long as adversarial
examples with small-perturbations are non-evasive, our fin-
gerprint is non-evasive. Our experiments show that the fin-
gerprint fulfills the correctness requirement and as such con-
stitutes a possible solution for deciding linkability from the
requirements posed in Section 5.
7 Related Work
Uchida et al. [50] proposed the first watermarking scheme
for neural networks. They embed the secret message into the
weights during training and implement a white-box verifica-
tion. Their watermark is evaluated against fine-tuning and
pruning as removal attacks. Adi et al. [1] propose overfit-
ting the source model on abstract images to provide water-
marking. Zhang et al. [56] additionally propose modifying
benign inputs by adding Gaussian noise or labels and small
patches on top of the image and train the neural network to
identify these as a backdoor-basedwatermark. Guo et al. [20]
also use perturbation to watermark. They additionally allow
encoding the identity of the data owner into the watermark.
Hitaj et al. [24] show that backdoor-based black-box verifi-
able watermarking schemes are vulnerable to evasion. An
adversary can deploy the watermarked model, but detect out-
of-distribution (backdoor) queries and return random labels.
To prevent this attack, Li et al. [31] created a blind water-
marking scheme that creates watermark images close to the
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Dataset Type Test Accuracy
Fingerprint
Accuracy
Type Test Accuracy
Fingerprint
Accuracy
CINIC
D1
Training Surrogate Training Reference
ResNet20 (Source) 0.770 1.00 - - -
ResNet20 [0.746, 0.764] 1.00 ResNet20 [0.660, 0.777] 0.00
ResNet56 [0.762, 0.774] 1.00 ResNet56 [0.788, 0.807] 0.00
Densenet [0.749, 0.763] 1.00 Densenet [0.734, 0.780] 0.00
VGG16 [0.716, 0.747] 1.00 VGG16 [0.750, 0.765] 0.00
VGG19 [0.790, 0.792] 1.00 VGG19 [0.779, 0.787] 0.00
MobileNetV2 [0.769, 0.783] 1.00 MobileNetV2 [0.677, 0.797] 0.00
CINIC
D2
Testing Surrogate Testing Reference
MobileNetV2 [0.765, 0.771] [0.97, 0.98] MobileNetV2 [0.812, 0.833] 0.41
ResNet20 [0.754, 0.757] [0.91, 0.94] ResNet20 [0.783, 0.787] [0.45, 0.51]
ResNet56 [0.763, 0.767] [0.96, 0.99] ResNet56 [0.808, 0.811] [0.42, 0.49]
Densenet [0.753, 0.761] [0.98, 0.99] Densenet [0.782, 0.783] [0.55, 0.68]
VGG16 [0.747, 0.760] [0.93, 0.94] VGG16 [0.740, 0.744] [0.64, 0.65]
VGG19 [0.777, 0.781] [0.92, 0.96] VGG19 [0.805, 0.823] [0.30, 0.39]
Table 2: An overview of the models, their testing accuracies and conferrability score for ε = 0.15 on CINIC. Brackets denote
the minimum and maximum measured value.
original distribution using a GAN, so that the attacker (and
the distinguisher in the GAN) cannot distinguish these from
regular queries. DeepSigns is a black-box verifiable water-
marking framework by Rouhani et al. [12]. Their framework
specifically selects rare inputs as watermarks on which the
deep neural network does not produce high confidence clas-
sifications. The framework assigns each watermark a random
class and embeds the watermark by fine-tuning the model on
the watermark with a decreased learning rate to limit utility
loss of the model. All these schemes have in common that
the model is overfitted on some uncommon inputs that can
be used to identify the model during the verification phase. It
has been shown by Shafieniejad et al. [41] that the backdoor-
based watermarking schemes from Adi et al. [1] and Zhang
et al. [56] are not robust to distillation attacks. None of the
proposed schemes evaluate whether their watermark is se-
cure against distillation attacks.
The first watermarking scheme that provides some de-
fenses against model extraction is DAWN [45], which uses
an active defense and assumes the adversary has only black-
box access to the watermarked model. DAWN intercepts
0.03 −0.05% of all queries and returns false labels to embed
a watermark in the surrogate. However, their scheme is ex-
plicitly not secure against extraction attacks that use as many
queries as required to train a fresh model, e.g., by querying
several close images where only one is associated with a
false label. This includes no claimed security against distil-
lation attacks. Our work is secure against an attacker with
white-box access to the source model, i.e., against extraction
attacks using any number of queries and does not impact the
model’s performance.
Cao et al. [3] recently proposed a framework for intellec-
tual property protection using fingerprinting similar to our
work. Their main idea is to generate inputs close to the de-
cision boundary which are shown to be robust against fine-
tuning and compression. They have not been tested as robust
against distillation attacks.
8 Conclusion
We formally define fingerprinting for deep neural networks
and empirically verify that it withstands distillation and other
removal attacks, such as fine-tuning, adversarial training,
three well-established model extraction attacks [25, 37, 38]
and two adaptive attacks that we designed ourselves. We in-
troduced conferrable adversarial examples for fingerprinting
and experimentally verify their existence for deep neural net-
works on the CINIC and a subset of the ImageNet32 dataset
with 100 classes. We show that known adversarial attacks
such as the DeepFool, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD),
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) and Carlini Wagner (CW-L2)
have a relatively low success rate for producing conferrable
adversarial examples and are thus unsuitable for direct us-
age in a fingerprinting algorithm. In response, we design
and evaluate an adversarial attack maximizing conferrability,
called C-BIM, used in our fingerprintingmethod. We demon-
strate that highly conferrable adversarial can be found using a
relatively small perturbation of ε = 0.05 so that an adversary
can not easily evade the verification procedure. We empiri-
cally find that our fingerprint has 100% fingerprint retention
for both CINIC and ImageNet32 for a verification threshold
of θ = 0.7 against all evaluated attacks.
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Dataset Type Test Accuracy
Fingerprint
Accuracy
Type Test Accuracy
Fingerprint
Accuracy
Image-
Net32
D1
Training Surrogate Training Reference
ResNet20 (Source) 0.557 1.00 - - -
ResNet20 [0.539, 0.555] 1.00 ResNet20 [0.539, 0.569] 0.00
ResNet56 [0.551,0.564] 1.00 ResNet56 [0.5612, 0.601] 0.00
Densenet [0.533,0.535] 1.00 Densenet [0.536, 0.560] 0.00
VGG19 [0.553, 0.566] 1.00 VGG19 [0.534, 0.541] 0.00
MobileNetV2 [0.586, 0.591] 1.00 MobileNetV2 0.638 0.00
Image-
Net32
D2
Testing Surrogate Testing Reference
MobileNetV2 [0.5264, 0.531] [0.96, 0.98] MobileNetV2 [0.627, 0.631] [0.58, 0.64]
ResNet20 [0.531, 0.532] [0.96, 0.98] ResNet20 [0.543, 0.557]] [0.44, 0.50]
ResNet56 [0.542, 0.549] [0.98, 1.00] ResNet56 [0.589, 0.593] 0.5
Densenet [0.499, 0.520] [0.82, 0.98] Densenet [0.556, 0.563] [0.38, 0.56]
VGG19 [0.519, 0.531] 0.76 VGG19 [0.528, 0.554] [0.28, 0.40]
Table 3: An overview of the models, their testing accuracies and conferrability score for ε = 0.15 on a subset of 100 classes
from ImageNet32. Brackets denote the minimum and maximum measured value.
Dataset Type Attack A
Test
Acc
FP
Acc
CINIC
D2
Model Extraction
ResNet20 Jagielski 0.756 0.99
ResNet20 Papernot 0.735 0.97
ResNet20 Knockoff 0.730 0.99
Fine-Tuning
ResNet20 FTLL 0.775 1.00
ResNet20 FTAL 0.773 1.00
ResNet20 RTLL 0.720 0.98
ResNet20 RTAL 0.668 0.98
Adversarial Training
ResNet20 FGM 0.757 1.00
ResNet20 PGD 0.768 1.00
Adaptive Attacks
ResNet20 Ensemble (n=3) 0.742 0.97
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.05 0.739 0.98
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.10 0.735 0.94
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.20 0.733 0.96
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.30 0.717 0.92
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.40 0.705 0.79
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.50 0.677 0.82
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.05 0.753 0.97
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.10 0.748 1.00
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.15 0.748 0.97
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.20 0.749 0.98
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.25 0.754 0.98
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.30 0.752 0.95
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.35 0.753 0.96
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.40 0.759 0.87
Table 4: Removal attacks on CINIC.
Dataset Type Attack A
Test
Acc
FP
Acc
Image-
net32
D2
Model Extraction
ResNet20 Jagielski 0.532 0.98
ResNet20 Papernot 0.509 0.90
ResNet20 Knockoff 0.474 0.98
Fine-Tuning
ResNet20 FTLL 0.573 1.00
ResNet20 FTAL 0.613 1.00
ResNet20 RTLL 0.590 1.00
ResNet20 RTAL 0.45 0.82
Adversarial Training
ResNet20 FGM 0.554 1.00
ResNet20 PGD 0.556 1.00
Adaptive Attacks
ResNet20 n=3 0.505 0.80
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.05 0.510 0.79
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.10 0.498 0.73
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.20 0.467 0.64
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.30 0.365 0.50
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.40 0.190 0.21
ResNet20 Noise λ = 0.50 0.122 0.07
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.05 0.543 0.97
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.10 0.528 0.89
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.15 0.533 0.91
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.20 0.545 0.93
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.25 0.539 0.88
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.30 0.547 0.90
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.35 0.551 0.85
ResNet20 Labels ρ = 0.40 0.543 0.83
Table 5: Removal Attacks on ImageNet32.
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9 Appendix
We selected the following 100 classes from ImageNet32:
[’kit fox’, ’Persian cat’, ’gazelle’, ’porcupine’, ’sea lion’,
’killer whale’, ’African elephant’, ’jaguar’, ’otterhound’,
’hyena’, ’sorrel’, ’dalmatian’, ’fox squirrel’, ’tiger’, ’zebra’,
’ram’, ’orangutan’, ’squirrel monkey’, ’komondor’, ’guinea
pig’, ’golden retriever’, ’macaque’, ’pug’, ’water buffalo’,
’American black bear’, ’giant panda’, ’armadillo’, ’gib-
bon’, ’German shepherd’, ’koala’, ’umbrella’, ’soccer ball’,
’starfish’, ’grand piano’, ’laptop’, ’strawberry’, ’airliner’, ’bal-
loon’, ’space shuttle’, ’aircraft carrier’, ’tank’, ’missile’,
’mountain bike’, ’steam locomotive’, ’cab’, ’snowplow’,
’bookcase’, ’toilet seat’, ’pool table’, ’orange’, ’lemon’, ’vi-
olin’, ’sax’, ’volcano’, ’coral reef’, ’lakeside’, ’hammer’,
’vulture’, ’hummingbird’, ’flamingo’, ’great white shark’,
’hammerhead’, ’stingray’, ’barracouta’, ’goldfish’, ’Ameri-
can chameleon’, ’green snake’, ’European fire salaman-
der’, ’loudspeaker’, ’microphone’, ’digital clock’, ’sunglass’,
’combination lock’, ’nail’, ’altar’, ’mountain tent’, ’score-
board’, ’mashed potato’, ’head cabbage’, ’cucumber’, ’plate’,
’necklace’, ’sandal’, ’ski mask’, ’teddy’, ’golf ball’, ’red
wine’, ’sunscreen’, ’beer glass’, ’cup’, ’traffic light’, ’lip-
stick’, ’hotdog’, ’toilet tissue’, ’cassette’, ’lotion’, ’barrel’,
’basketball’, ’barbell’, ’pole’ ]
We instantiated the adversarial attacks with the following
parameters.
Method Iter α Grads κ lr q
IGM 100 0.01 - - - ∞
DeepFool 100 - 10 - - ∞
PGD 100 0.01 - - - 2
CW-L2 100 - - 50 0.01 2
Table 6: Parameters for the adversarial attacks. Iter are the
maximum number of iterations, α is the step-size, Grads is
the number of gradients evaluated in parallel for DeepFool,
κ and lr are the confidence and the learning rate for the CW-
L2 attack and q is the norm.
9.1 Other Types of Linkability
There are other lines of research for proving linkability,
which deviates from our definition of linkability in various
Figure 7: Fingerprints obtained from C-BIM with ε = 0.25
on ImageNet32.
Figure 8: Fingerprints obtained from C-BIM with ε = 0.1 on
ImageNet32.
ways. The work by Yu et al. [54, 55] studies fingerprints for
GANs where the goal is to link a given image to the gener-
ator that created it, given black-box access to all generators.
Their work links outputs, while our work links models. The
work by Wang et al. [51] links models for transfer learning
that share the same base model. We do not consider trans-
fer learning in this work but focus on the linkability of mod-
els for the same task. DeepMarks [8] uses the term "finger-
printing" with a different meaning than our work, referring
to a watermark that is robust specifically against collusion
attacks, among other attacks.
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